Eisen Identificatie op Afstand

NOTE 1: A physical or digital identity document as defined in the present document will usually represent a natural person only. Identity documents that evidence that a natural person represents a legal person can be envisaged but cannot be assumed to be generally available.

De term 'legal person' is in deze context niet relevant voor de Nederlandse situatie.

De term 'present document' dient gelezen te worden als het bron document, oftewel de ETSI TS 119 461 standaard v1.1.1.

NOTE 2: Required for verification against the applicant's physical appearance for binding to applicant. The binding is by biometric technology or by manual verification, or a combination of the two, see clause 8.4 of the present document.

NOTE 3: This does not exclude the use of supplementary documents without a face photo or similar information.

NOTE 4: The present document only specifies requirements for binding to applicant using face biometrics and/or manual face verification. Requirement COL-8.2.3-02 does not exclude the possibility of using other biometrics, e.g. fingerprint or iris, but the present document does not specify requirements for such use cases. 

Voor ETD/eHerkenning is de eis alleen van toepassing op identificatie op afstand en worden alleen paspoorten en nationale identiteitskaarten, zoals vermeld bij PRADO, geaccepteerd.

PRADO is beschikbaar op de volgende locatie: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/prado/nl

NOTE 5: The comparable reliability of other identity documents can be based on a comparison of protection against known threats.

NOTE 6: Some countries issue national identity cards or have valid national identity cards that are below current practice in the security of national identity documents. Identity proofing context requirements can be to not accept such national identity cards.

Voor ETD/eHerkenning wordt eMRTD alleen geaccepteerd overeenkomstig ICAO 9303 part 10 [2] en als de data uit de chip gevalideerd kan worden door een controle van de digitale handtekening van het betreffende land. 

Andere documenten met vergelijkbare betrouwbaarheid MOGEN toegestaan worden. Het is aan de deelnemer om deze betrouwbaarheid aan te tonen. Standaard toegestane document(en), naast de documenten overeenkomstig ICAO 9303 part 10 [2];

• Nederlandse rijbewijs; Model 6I van 14 november 2014

ICAO 9303 is beschikbaar op de volgende locatie: https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/publication.aspx?docnum=9303

ICAO 9303 definities:

MRTD = Machine Readable Travel Document
Official document, conforming with the specifications contained in Doc 9303, issued by a State or organization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. MRP, MRV, MROTD) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary in a format which is capable of being read by machine.

eMRTD = Electronic Machine Readable Travel Document

An MRTD (passport, visa or card) that has a contactless integrated circuit embedded in it and the capability of being used for biometric identification of the MRTD holder in accordance with the standards specified in the relevant Part of Doc 9303 — Machine Readable Travel Documents.

NOTE 1: Usually this means that the validation result is TOTAL-PASSED as defined by ETSI EN 319 102-1 [i.5].

NOTE 2: For an eMRTD document following ICAO 9303 part 10 [2], country signing certificates, e.g. downloaded from the ICAO PKD (Public Key Database), are needed for validation.

Bij NOTE 1: ETSI EN 319 102-1 is beschikbaar op de volgende locatie: https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319100_319199/31910201/01.01.01_60/en_31910201v010101p.pdf

NOTE 3: Meaning not revoked, suspended, or reported as lost/stolen. Not all document issuers have available lookup services to check validity, and in some cases access to lookup services is restricted. Regarding current validity, note that there can be a delay in the order of days between the events of revoking a document and updating a status service.

NOTE 4: If digital identity documents from many different sources are accepted, online access (interactive or by API) to all the different status services can be impractical for documents that occur infrequently.

Voor ETD/eHerkenning wordt deze eis ingevuld middels een gestolen/vermist-controle vanaf betrouwbaarheidsniveau LoA3.

NOTE 5: Fulfilment of this requirement can depend on the protocol supported by the chip; reliable fulfilment can be difficult if the chip does not support a protocol that supports cloning detection.

NOTE 6: Fulfilment of this requirement can rely on the applicant's use of software that is approved for the identity proofing process, e.g. mobile app functionality.

NOTE 2: It is required that this happens at the time of the identity proofing; submission of a pre-recorded photo or video stream of an identity document is considered not to meet the requirements for identity proofing to Baseline LoIP.

NOTE 3: This can rely on the applicant's use of software approved for the identity proofing process, e.g. mobile app functionality.

EXAMPLE 1: The applicant can be given instructions for the movement of the identity document, where the specific actions and/or their sequence are unpredictable to the applicant.

NOTE 4: With the current state of technology, the use of a still photo of the identity document is not considered sufficient for Baseline LoIP. This can change in the future with the development of image analysis technology.

EXAMPLE 2: Both the front and back sides of a national identity card will usually need to be presented.

Bij EXAMPLE 3: PRADO is beschikbaar op de volgende locatie: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/prado/nl

NOTE 6: Meaning not revoked, suspended, or reported as lost/stolen. Not all document issuers have available lookup services to check validity, and in some cases access to lookup services is restricted. Regarding current validity, note that there can be a delay in the order of days between the events of revoking a document and updating a status service.

NOTE 7: If physical identity documents from many different sources are accepted, online access (interactive or by API) to all the different status services can be impractical for documents that occur infrequently.

NOTE 8: Information can be extracted by manual transcription, automatically for example by optical scanning and OCR techniques, and in some cases by photo/photocopy of the document.

NOTE 9: In addition to identity attributes, required information to be recorded is typically at least issuer, validity period, and the document's unique identification number.

NOTE 10: This requirement implies that a purely manual process for validating a physical identity document is allowed both for physical presence and for remote identity proofing. However, the use of (additional) automated means is recommended.

NOTE 11: The document type, e.g. a passport of a specific country, can be an input parameter to the analysis, or the analysis can determine the type by automated means.

NOTE 12: Automated and manual analysis can be used in combination, e.g. with fall-back to manual analysis if the automated process yields an uncertain result, or by using automated analysis as a tool for a human registration officer.

NOTE 1: For the evidence types existing eID means and existing digital signature means, no specific binding requirements are needed since the validation of the evidence also verifies the binding. This is under the assumption that only the applicant can use the eID means or digital signature means.

NOTE 2: For the supplementary evidence types trusted register, proof of access, and documents and attestations, no specific binding requirements are needed. If the binding of the authoritative evidence (identity document, eID means, or digital signature means) to the applicant is successful, and the supplementary evidence is validated and identifies the same person, the supplementary evidence is considered bound to the applicant.

NOTE 4: In particular to protect against replay attack with an injection of another video stream in the process.

NOTE 5: This can rely on the applicant's use of software approved for the identity proofing process, e.g. mobile app functionality.

Presentation Attack Detection (PAD): automated determination of a presentation attack

NOTE 6: A morphed photo is created by merging the face photos of two or more different persons into one photo. Since some countries allow persons to bring their own photo for issuing a passport or national identity card, there is a risk that documents are issued with morphed photos. With a morphed photo, there is a risk that both/all the persons can be recognized both by a human registration officer and by face biometrics with a reliability above the applied threshold, meaning more than one person can use the identity document containing the morphed photo.

NOTE 7: Morphing detection means are best applied in the binding to applicant step of an identity proofing process when a new photo, known not to be morphed, of the applicant can be compared to the potentially morphed reference photo.

Bij EXAMPLE 1:

• Het FISWG-document waaraan gerefereerd wordt is beschikbaar op de volgende locatie: https://fiswg.org/documents.html
• Het ENFSI-document waaraan gerefereerd wordt is beschikbaar op de volgende locatie: https://enfsi.eu/documents/best-practice-manuals

EXAMPLE 1: The result can be digitally signed and encrypted at the message level or be transmitted over a properly secured communication channel.

NOTE 1: The present document places no requirement on the format of the result of the identity proofing. Example formats can be a document (e.g. PDF), structured data (e.g. XML, JSON), or an identity assertion (e.g. OIDC, SAML).

NOTE 2: The result of the identity proofing process can convey the attributes that are verified and the LoIP, but can even be a simple 'success' or 'failure' statement meaning that identity attributes provided by the TSP at the start of the identity proofing process are verified (or not) against the applicant to the required LoIP.

NOTE 3: The present document makes no assumption on the attributes to convey, whether the applicant is a natural person, a legal person, or a natural person representing a legal person (roles or authorizations can be relevant in the latter case).

NOTE 4: The present document makes no assumptions on the information to convey for identity proofing processes that do not complete successfully.

Bij NOTE 2: voor ETD/eHerkenning kan de term TSP gelezen worden als middeluitgever (MU).

Bij NOTE 3: 'legal person' is in deze context niet relevant voor de Nederlandse situatie.

Bij EXAMPLE 2: ETSI 119 461 definities:

baseline LoIP
Level of Identity Proofing (LoIP) reaching a high level of confidence based on the fulfilment of general good practice requirements for the identity proofing process and considered suitable for the trust services policies currently defined by ETSI standards

NOTE 1: Evidence can be retained in digital or paper format.

NOTE 2: The need to retain evidence of identity proofing processes that did not complete successfully can be determined by the identity proofing context.

NOTE 3: Gathering and retention of evidence is required to comply with applicable data protection legislation, notably GDPR if the identity proofing process is carried out under the legislation of an EU Member State

De bewaartermijnen dienen conform AVG te worden vastgesteld.

Bij EXAMPLE 3: voor ETD/eHerkenning kan de term TSP gelezen worden als middeluitgever (MU).